Being and Time

[kmik]

I'll be a little more careful. We've established that being is not a being. I'd have thought that's because beings show up within being, so being cannot be a being in itself, but the reasoning here is different: being is not a being since all beings are. My mistake was to assume that the dichotomy of is/"is not" applies to being but I suppose it doesn't (it only does to things, to beings), and to understand the sentence in negation (that is, "beings are, rather than not", and not simply "beings are")

[Nile577]

Originally Posted by kmik

I'd have thought that's because beings show up within being, so being cannot be a being in itself, but the reasoning here is different...

No, I think you are correct. I think the "all beings are..." explanation tries to say the same thing, though not as eloquently as you have phrased it here.

[Nile577]

3 - The Ontological Priority of the Question of Being

Paragraph 1

We have gained some insight into the unique character of the question of being. However, the true nature of this uniqueness will only become evident when we understand the function, intention and motives of the question.

Paragraph 2

As yet the question of being (what is the meaning of being?) lacks an answer. What purpose, though, does our enquiry serve? Is the question mere "free-floating speculation about the most general generalities" or is it "the most basic and at the same time most concrete question?"

Paragraph 3

Heidegger begins this paragraph by declaring, "being is always the being of a being." As this being of a being, being determines the being as the being it is. Put differently: being, as the being of a thing, determines that thing as the thing it is.

All beings taken together demarcate the realm of certain kinds of knowledge. The concepts of life, space, history and nature, for example, demarcate realms of knowledge about beings in total. “Space” is the positional relationship between beings, “history” purports to be the record of beings in time, “nature” is the natural order and law of beings.

Now, science can investigate these areas and try to establish theories about them but, to a certain extent, they are already understood beforehand. That is, we must already have some understanding of the being of “life” before we can devise a theoretical/scientific investigation into what it is to be a “living thing” as opposed to an “inorganic thing.” "Life" is a category, or type, of being. Categories of being are called ontologies. The specific results of scientific investigations are not particularly important; what is important is any subsequent ontological modification of its founding concept (in the instance under discussion: what it means to be “alive.”)

Paragraphs 4 & 5

The most developed sciences are capable of sustaining radical alteration of their foundational concepts. Quantum physics, for example, alters the concept of what it is for a being to be present in “space,” postulating that a subatomic particle can occupy numerous areas of “space” at once.

Paragraph 6

Ontological concepts leap ahead and disclose a type of being (i.e. “life) that can then be thematised into a scientific enquiry. The area called “life” is disclosed by an ontological understanding of being that comes before scientific investigation. “Since each of these areas arises from the domain of beings themselves, [they are revealed by] nothing else than interpreting these beings in terms of the basic constitution of their being.” Interpreting beings in terms of their being, argues Heidegger, is something that human beings can do from pre-scientifically. It is this that gives rise to ontologies.

Science and scientific concepts, then, are not primary. The foundational areas of knowledge pertaining to the totality of beings are first disclosed as ontological regions of being. This understanding leaps ahead of scientific investigation and should not be confused with logic. Ontology founds and demarcates a region for scientific enquiry; logic comes later, investigating the methodology of the scientific enquiry.

“Thus, for example, what is philosophically primary is not a theory of concept-formation in historiology (the study of history, “History”), not the theory of historical knowledge, not even the theory of history as the object of historiology; what is primary is rather the (ontological) interpretation of genuinely historical beings with regard to their historicality."
That is, what is primary is the ontological demarcation of "historical beings" (as a type of being) to be interpreted in their historicality.

Ontology precedes scientific theory. Heidegger has demonstrated the ontological priority of the question of being. BUT:

Paragraph 7

The question of being is not a traditional question.

Even if we established an ontological genealogy of every category of being possible and every way of being whatsoever, we would not have enquired as to the meaning of being in general. It is Da-sein’s understanding of being that allows us to understand beings as the beings they are. We understand the fundamental areas of knowledge (ontological regions) in the field of beings in their totality only in light of our understanding of being in general. Pre-scientific ontology, that is, is itself grounded in our preontological understanding of being. The ontological category "quantity," for example, can only arise as a region of knowledge if we first of all understand being in general.

As this preontological understanding of being is not something given in lived experience (as ontological understanding is), but is the grounding possibility of all experience whatsoever, it is prior not only to scientific theory but all formal ontology. Formal ontology interprets beings in regard to their kind of being; our preontological understanding of being allows beings to show up for that interpretation as the beings they are.

Paragraph 8

“The question of being thus aims at an a priori condition of the possibility not only of the sciences which investigate beings of such and such a type – and are thereby already involved in an understanding of being; but it aims also at the condition of the possibility of the ontologies which precede the ontic sciences and found them.”

To elaborate: the ontic (concerned with the factual propertes of beings) sciences are founded by ontologies (disclosures of types of being). Biology is possible only once the ontological concept of life (the kind of being that living beings are) has been disclosed. Once the ontological region of “life” has been demarcated we can investigate living beings with regard to their specific attributes (and then possibly modify our initial demarcation). The initial demarcation arises from pre-scientific experience. [Note: the ontic sciences are not just the “hard” sciences. They are any theoretical mode of study.] Ontological regions of beings can only show up, however, only if we already understand being in general. To understand “living beings” we must first understand being.

Being and Time seeks to investigate the question of the meaning of being. Understanding the meaning of being is the a priori condition not just for science but for all ontologies whatsoever.

“All ontology, no matter how rich and tightly knit a system of categories it has as its disposal, remains fundamentally blind… if it has not previously clarified the meaning of being.”

Paragraph 9

As an investigation into the ground of ontologies (which themselves ground scientific enquiry), the question of being achieves its ontological priority. This is the priority of fundamental ontology.

[Nile577]

Primordial chart of being

Most primordial: Our preontological (implicit) understanding of being. This understanding allows ontologies (disclosures of kinds of being, or ways of being) to arise.

Less primordial: Ontological disclosures of being. These demarcate types, or categories, of being within the field of beings as a whole. For example: life, history, space, quantity, quality.

Least primordial : The ontic sciences. These are concerned with the factual properties of specific beings.

[Nile577]

4 - The Ontic Priority of the Question of Being

Paragraph 1

The sciences are practiced by humans and therefore have Da-sein as a way of being. Da-sein can be scientific when it adopts a stance towards another being which designates the being as an object for enquiry by a subject (Da-sein itself). "Scientific research," however, "is neither the sole nor most immediate kind of being" that is possible for Da-sein. When typing this paragraph, for example, though I am using a keyboard, it is not, for me, an object for investigation. It is only when a key breaks, perhaps, that suddenly the keyboard leaps out as an object for diagnostic research. In such an instance, I would intently consider the keyboard as an object and develop a theory of how to proceed (a number of options would be open to me). The predominant way in which Da-sein is amidst other beings is not as a subject among objects.

Da-sein is "distinctly different" from other beings in its structure, nature and kind. Although we have as yet only a preliminary understanding of Da-sein, Heidegger will now attempt to adumbrate the ways in which Da-Sein is unique.

Paragraph 2 & 3

Heidegger notes that Da-sein is not the same kind of being as other beings. Rather, "it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its being." What does it mean to be "ontically distinguished?"

An ontic understanding of being is concerned with the factual properties of specific beings. The property of Da-sein that distinguishes it from other beings is that, in its being, it interprets and is "concerned about its [very own] being." I can interpret (take a stand on) my being as being a "librarian," or "son," for example. This constitutive, innate ability to understanding being is a factual quality that belongs to da-sein's onticality. As Heidegger puts it "The ontic distinction of Da-sein is that it is ontological." To be ontological means to understand and interpret being.

Heidegger calls the kind of being that can understand its own being in this way "existence." As Dreyfus notes, in this special usage of the term, rocks, trees and animals do not exist.

Paragraph 4

When we write of Da-sein being ontological, we do not mean that Da-sein engages with a formal theory of ontology to understand being. The kind of understanding of being that Da-sein has (and is) is preontological (implicit; before any worked out theory of being).

It is this preontological understanding of being that allows Da-sein to understand its own being and, indeed, to understand being in general.

NOTE: Da-sein is absolutely NOT synonymous with "consciousness." We should not at all think of Da-sein as a conscious subject. Rather, it is only because of the existential structure of Da-sein (that is: the kind of being it is) that it is able to understand its being as embodying "consciousness" at all. That is - to return to our previous example - only occasionally (e.g. when the keyboard breaks) does Da-sein interpret itself as being a conscious subject, and this interpretation is made possible only by Da-sein's underlying structure. That is to say: only rarely is Da-sein a conscious subject and this is is made possible by the fundamental being of Da-sein. Likewise, to be "self" aware presupposes a preontological understanding of "self."

Da-sein does not have a fixed nature but instead interprets itself as a "sexual," "religious," "genetic" (etc.) being. Because it is alarming for Da-sein to realise it does not have a fixed nature, it often 'flees' into a particular modality of its interpretive possibilities to the extent that its interpretive nature is obscured.These possibilities are not something a Da-sein can wholly create
itself. To interpret myself as a "priest" (to use Dreyfus' example) requires that a "priestly" way of being be culturally given. One could not be a priest in Attic times as that mode of being was not possible for Da-sein (Da-sein would simply be a rather meek ascetic).

Heidegger calls the modes of Da-sein's possible ways of being its existentiell modes. The underlying ontological structure of Da-sein (i.e. a being that in its being comports itself towards its own being) he terms the existential structure. That Da-sein can understand itself as a father, priest, lover, criminal etc. is an existentiell understanding of its ways of being. That Da-Sein is of an ontic-ontological structure (that is, ontically it is ontological) is an existential understanding of Da-sein. The existentiell modes of Da-sein are predicated upon its existential structure.

All theories or worldviews that assign to Da-sein a fixed nature (i.e. psychology, biological determinism, geneticism, politics etc) have superficially glossed over Da-sein’s existential structure, and will therefore remain groundless until such a structure is explicated. Without this grounding, the above “worldviews” do great violence to the possibility for thoughtfulness pertaining to the question of what it is to be human.

(Paragraphs 5 - 12 to follow)

[kmik]

I just want to say that I still try to follow this "column", although I barely get to see my sweet home now. So keep up the good job!

[hibernal_dream]

I must say, excellent work so far in helping us understand the text.

That Da-Sein is of an ontic-ontological structure (that is, ontically it is ontological) is an existential understanding of Da-sein.

I'm not sure if i know what this means. Without using jargon, are you saying that in fact (scientifically), Dasein understands in a vague sort of way the shape of being in general, and it's also able to interpret the mode which it is in at a particular time? And that the statement I just made is an existential description of Dasein?