Here begins our reading. Please feel free to ask questions or correct misunderstandings on my part. A free online copy of the translation I am using may be found here:
http://www.archive.org/details/Being...artinHeidegger
Preface
Quote:
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Originally Posted by Martin Heidegger
"Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word being? Not at all. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'being.' Not at all. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of being and to do so concretely" - Being and Time xix (please note: all page references are to the Joan Stambaugh translation, Suny, 1996)
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Thus, before we even reach the introduction of Being and Time, Heidegger has adumbrated the task at hand: nothing less than the working out of the meaning of being. The significance of this question must by necessity remain obscure at this preliminary juncture, yet perhaps we may venture a few preparatory remarks for our engagement with this text.
The 'question of being' would fuel Heidegger's entire philosophical project, and it has thus far informed two generations of thinkers in 'continental' philosophy, theology, artificial intelligence and psychology (ironically, categories which Heidegger would reject). Here the question is presented abruptly, with the promise of further elucidation, yet already we are asked to consider the '
meaning of being.' What is meant here by 'meaning?' Are we concerned with a purely semantic definition of the word 'being?' In what sense, to whom, and how can we speak of 'meaning?' Is the question one of traditional epistemology?
As it forms the ground upon which our enquiry is to unfold, it is essential to tackle this question at the outset. In part because of the unfinished nature of Being and Time, it is extremely easy to lose track of Heidegger's stated task, and thus misunderstand the thrust of his thinking. I will say more about this in future posts.
In her guide to Being and Time, Magda King notes that "meaning, according to Heidegger, is that from which something is understandable as the thing it is." How do we understand something as the thing it is? Let us try to give an example of our own.
Consider a garden rake. How do we understand it as that which it is - a rake - and not simply a collection of molecules among others, a type of wood, or a quality of steel? Well, in a sense, it has a function as a tool. If we wished to convey the meaning of 'garden rake' to a child, we might first of all tell him it is a tool for loosening soil, and, assuming that he already possessed an understanding of 'tool,' we might then reveal that it is a tool for gardening. However, only if the child understood that raking loosened the soil for
gardening - the dwelling-undertaking by which a gardener cares for the land, tills the earth and brings forth plants - would he understand the rake as
essentially the thing it is.
Why would it not be sufficient to demonstrate the functional usage of the rake, you may ask? Because "function" is not isolated from "world." A child might see a skilled typist pressing keys on a keyboard, and be able to perform the motor task of
pressing buttons, but when
typing, one is bound up with "language," "communication" and "writing." Analogously, demonstrating the usage of the rake as that which loosens earth would allow a full understanding of the rake as the 'thing it is' only if one were to understand the bound-up nexus of "gardening," "growing" and "harvesting".
Mere factual knowledge of the rake's physical properties, molecular structure, colour and dimensions do not in themselves provide the meaning of a 'rake.' Even a simple demonstration of the rake as that which breaks earth provides only a limited understanding of the thing it is. From where, then, has this understanding taken place?
We have seen that something like a nexus reveals the rake. This nexus is the
world of human existence. As our investigation continues it will become clear that Heidegger means nothing like 'fixed extended space' when he employs the term 'world.' The term suggests, rather, a complex, equipmental nexus (though we get far ahead of ourselves here). For now it is sufficient to grasp that, for Heidegger, meaning comes from the human world of existence. Without the human world, a rake, a ten-dollar-bill and a baseball stadium would have no meaning as the things they are.
To return to King's definition, "meaning, according to Heidegger, is that from which something is understandable as the thing it is." Again then, from where is a rake understood? From the world of gardening or, in short, from the world of human existence. As will be revealed, we are not at all talking of the world as offering a mode of epistemological understanding, or bringing forth a structuralist analysis; rather of understanding coming from the underlying attunement of human being itself. For now this too must remain nebulous and unexplored.
The world of our quotidian existence comprises what Heidegger calls the 'horizon' (the region) of our understanding. Things show up meaningfully as the things they are when they are disclosed (revealed) in the horizon of human understanding. Being and Time will try to show that
time is the horizon of our understanding of being.
To return to our initial question - the meaning of being - Heidegger aims to undertake an analysis of how we are able to understand the meaning of being whatsoever. As King notes, ‘The horizon which makes it possible for us to understand being as being is itself the meaning of being.’ Some primary considerations and intense difficulties with the enquiry will be examined in our forthcoming reading of section 1, "The Necessity of an Explicit Retrieve of the Question of Being."
I am hopeful that my next post will be more approachable, with Heidegger presenting his formal introduction to the question.
Look forward to more posts.